In reading an interview with Nicholas Mulder published by the Atlantic (see: Can Sanctions Stop Russia?), something said by Mulder caught me:
Lowrey: Are there technological or technocratic innovations in this sanctions package we should be watching?
Mulder: This ban on high-tech components exported to Russia. That’s one part of the sanctions supported not only by the U.S. and the EU, but also by Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—the major semiconductor-manufacturing hubs of the world.
It’s a very big one because it’s going to have a medium-to-long-run effect on the capacity of the Russian economy to keep up its productivity growth and its ability to source components and hardware for its military industry. But it also has real elements of a dry run for using this sort of measure against China—that’s why those Asian countries are part of it, I think. It’s a diplomatic exercise: If we can do this with Russia, could we do it in the future with China?
It also includes something called a foreign-direct-product rule, which basically forbids the export or trade of products made in the United States or made using U.S. software or intellectual property.
The U.S. will put sanctions on any Singaporean trying to sell these chips manufactured in Singapore, because the intellectual property for them was designed in Palo Alto.
That last bit there about the US levelling sanctions on countries that sell products derived from intellectual property of USA domiciled firms is quite a bit like a social credit system. So if a country's social credit score falls because it has traded with a country like Russia, one banned from the globalist system owing to a bad social credit score, then that country too will be punished for having a lower social credit score.
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